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New Administration, New Immigration Regime: Do Parties Matter After All?  A UK Case Study 
Abstract 
Research on the impact of parties on public policy, and on immigration policy in particular, often 
finds limited evidence of partisan influence. In this paper, we examine immigration policymaking in 
the UK coalition government. Our case provides evidence that parties in government can have more 
of an impact on policy than previous studies acknowledge, but this only becomes apparent when we 
open up the ‘black box’ between election outcomes and policy outputs. By examining how, when 
and why election pledges are turned into government policies, we show that partisan influence 
depends not only on dynamics between the coalition partners, but how these dynamics interact with 
interdepartmental conflicts and lobbying by organized interests. In-depth process tracing allows us 
to see these complex dynamics, which easily get lost in large n comparisons of pledges and outputs, 
let alone outcomes. 
Introduction 
There is an intriguing paradox at the heart of the ‘do parties matter’ debate (see Schmidt, 1996; see 
also Imbeau et al., 2001).  The answer, at least according to decades of increasingly sophisticated 
cross-national comparative research would seem to be ‘politics hasn’t mattered – much’ (Caul and 
Gray, 2000) and may matter even less nowadays than it did before (Mair, 2008). Yet most of us who 
read that research – and no doubt many of those who conduct it – could  readily reel off a long list of 
examples from our own lived experience where a change of government triggered a perceptible, and 
sometimes even immediate, shift in policy.  
One explanation for this paradox is that most comparative work in the ‘does politics matter?’ debate 
is quantitative.  Research in this tradition, whatever its critics like to think, is not necessarily 
condemned to uncover only scant or trivially significant partisan effects: crunching the numbers can, 
after all, reveal that something really is going on even in sectors where, for example, one might 
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expect internationalization and economic constraints to limit parties’ impact (see for example, Knill 
et al., 2010).  Nevertheless, quantitative studies do find themselves at something of a disadvantage 
in one important sense, namely that they  often focus not so much on the relationship between 
inputs (manifesto pledges, for example) and outputs (government policies, legislated and otherwise), 
as on the relationship between inputs and outcomes (ie whether those policies have their desired 
result).   While understandable in certain respects, this approach runs the risk of proving something 
of a fool’s errand.  After all, as a policy moves from pledge to programme, and then from 
implementation to evaluation, any partisan effect is almost bound to be diluted in the process. That 
doesn’t mean, however, that politics never mattered in the first place. 
Another reason for our difficulty in proving that politics, and more specifically parties, matter even 
when we know (or at least believe) intuitively that they do is the fact that people who study those 
parties know relatively little about the governmental policy process, while people who study the 
policy process or political economy know relatively little about parties (see Streek and Thelen, 2005).  
For party scholars, policy is mostly about positioning, about attracting votes and winning and staying 
in power. For policy analysts, parties may well come up with policy ideas for electoral reasons but 
they are quickly left behind, and often left out of the account, as bureaucrats and interest groups, as 
well as sheer inertia, lead to the making of ‘policy without politicians’ (Page 2012, 2011; cf 
Richardson and Jordan 1979, Rose and Davies, 1994). The study of partisan influence in policymaking, 
in effect, risks falling between these two stools. 
In a way, both sets of scholars are equally wrong and equally right – which suggests an obvious way 
forward: party and policy analysts should get together and then get into the nitty-gritty, often 
qualitative work of picking a set of pledges, checking what gets lost in translation when thoughts are 
turned into words and words become deeds, and then making an informed judgement call on 
whether the party or parties in question did or did not make a difference.  In doing so, they should 
bear in mind that the ability to turn political dreams into policy realities comes pretty close to 
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alchemy and that politicians are doing well if they manage to turn gold into base metal let alone 
base metal into gold.  As the economist J. K. Galbraith (1969)  reminds us, it may be too much even 
to suggest that ‘politics is the art of the impossible’ since it often ‘consists in choosing between the 
disastrous and the unpalatable.’  
In this article we argue that parties in government have more of an impact on policy outputs than 
previous studies assume and acknowledge, but that this is only evident when we open up the ‘black 
box’ between election outcomes and policy outcomes in some detail.  Only by doing that can we 
understand how, when and why manifesto and election pledges are turned into government policies. 
In a complex interplay between politicians, civil servants, and non-governmental actors what 
matters for partisan influence is not simply a change of administration, although that is important, 
but the relative strength and influence of various interest groups and government departments too.  
There are complex interaction effects here, in which partisan influence may be concentrated or 
diluted. In the context of coalition governments, for example, the influence of different government 
departments  on policy depends not just on long-established ministerial hierarchies but on which 
party sits atop and astride those ministries. 
We begin by providing a rationale for our focus on immigration policy, for selecting as our case the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition which took office in the UK in 2010, and for our qualitative 
approach.  We then proceed in three stages.  First, we evaluate and explain the transition from the 
starkly different election pledges made by the two parties in the 2010 campaign to the coalition’s 
programme for government.  Second,  we summarise the government’s immigration policies to date. 
Third, we examine the process by which the coalition agreement  has been converted into policy 
outputs, examining the role of interest groups and intra-coalition dynamics in this process.  In a 
concluding section, we discuss the relevance of our findings for debates about partisan influence on 
public policy in general and immigration policy in particular.   
Focus, approach, and case 
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There is widespread agreement among scholars that whether a particular polity can be classified, 
following Lijphart (2012), as a majoritarian or a consensual democracy is important when trying to 
uncover whether parties make a difference. This is primarily because the single party majority 
governments that occur more frequently in the majoritarian type not only do not have to 
compromise with coalition partners but face legislatures that, generally speaking, are far weaker. 
Coalition politics adds another filter through which political fantasies must pass if they are  to 
become policy realities.  Coalition government also adds a party political twist to interdepartmental 
conflict, as partisan differences often become intertwined with the functional division of labour and 
interests between different government ministries.  Each of those ministries is likely to have 
institutional memories, interests and agendas of its own that may not sit well with the intentions of 
whichever elected politician is put in charge of it (see Laver and Shepsle, 1994; see also Thomson, 
2001). And in a coalition government, whoever is formally in charge will almost certainly have to 
work with junior ministers from another party (or parties) who have been deliberately placed there 
to keep an eye on them (see Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011). 
There is equally widespread agreement among scholars specialising in migration policy that the 
governments of liberal democratic states face a number of obstacles when it comes to controlling 
immigration – as many of their citizens would apparently like them to do (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2005; 
McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Sides and Citrin 2007). In terms of economic migrants, businesses and 
other pro-immigration ‘clients’, such as the education sector, often lobby governments and may 
exercise an expansionist influence on policy compared to the restrictive preferences of the public 
(Freeman, 1995); although as we show below the effect of these clients may in fact vary between 
immigration policy sub-fields. Furthermore, in the context of the European Union, many seeking to 
enter are EU citizens exercising free movement rights, who cannot therefore be excluded. In the 
areas of forced and family migration, court rulings drawing on international and national laws often 
stymie executives’ attempts to exclude ‘unwanted’ immigrants (Joppke, 1998). And when 
governments seek to deport unauthorised immigrants, they often face obstacles to removal in the 
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form of legal judgements and public counter-mobilisation (Ellermann, 2009). Policy-makers are also 
bound to take account of (or at least pay lip service to) the evidence provided by social, legal and 
economic research, at least some of which casts doubt upon their capacity to control flows and, 
indeed, the advisability of so doing, although there is of course an extent to which governments 
commission research not so much to act on it, but rather to legitimise their existing plans and 
preferences (see Boswell, 2009). 
Given all this, it is no surprise that many observers were deeply sceptical about the UK government’s 
ability to make good on the promise it made in May 2010 to reduce net migration. This scepticism 
was partly informed by the fact that this was a coalition rather than a single party majority 
government.  The senior partner in the coalition was the Conservative Party – a party with a long 
record of wanting to appear tough on this issue that had only been partly played down by its 
relatively new leader, David Cameron, who, while he was concerned lest too hard a line alienate 
well-heeled, well-educated voters, was also determined to make the most of the lead over Labour 
which that hard line gave his party among the rest of the electorate (see Bale, 2013; Bale et al, 2011).  
The Tories’ junior partners were the Liberal Democrats – a party which had campaigned at the 
general election in 2010 on a platform that called for the regularisation of significant numbers of 
illegal immigrants.  Although the Conservatives ensured that they would control the Home Office, 
the UK’s equivalent of what in most continental European democracies is known as the Interior 
Ministry, it would have to reckon with the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, which 
would be headed up by a senior – indeed, virtually ‘unsackable’ – Liberal Democrat who, as a self-
confessed social democrat, had little compunction about voicing his ideological and practical doubts 
as to the merits of Conservative policies across the piece. Furthermore, any attempt to make 
significant reductions in numbers coming into and staying in the UK would run up against many of 
the obstacles identified above, namely employers and educational institutions with an interest in the 
entry of workers and students, and pro-migrant groups willing to take cases to courts using human 
rights legislation that militates against restriction. Last, but by no means least, the commitment to 
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reduce net migration seemed a hostage to fortune since that figure is just as influenced by 
emigration (over which the government has no control) as it is by immigration, and furthermore at 
least one important component of immigration – the free movement of EU citizens – cannot be 
restricted so long as the UK remains in the EU.  
In spite of all these obstacles, net migration did initially fall and immigration control was seen as one 
of the government’s few success stories, not least by those pressure groups and right-wing 
newspapers that had attacked the previous Labour government (see, for example, Migration Watch, 
2013 and Pollard, 2013). However, as the recent 30 percent increase in the figures up to 212,000 in 
the year to September 2013 show, even with restrictive policies in place, factors outside of the 
government’s control (in this case reduced emigration and a rise in EU citizens arriving from the 
jobless economies of Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece) meant that achieving the outcome promised 
in 2010 was always going to be difficult. Notwithstanding this, as we discuss below, policy tightening 
has had an appreciable impact on inflows. Politics, in other words, seems to have made a difference 
– and in what were some exceptionally unpropitious circumstances. 
This unexpected success – if success is what it is – makes the UK a fascinating case study.  As in many 
other states, public opinion in the UK, while more nuanced than often imagined (see Ashcroft, 2013; 
see also Mclaren and Johnson, 2007) has turned decidedly negative on immigration and there is 
some evidence to suggest that such shifts do – thermostatically, as it were (Jennings, 2010) – 
eventually encourage policy-makers to respond to them (see also Ford et al., forthcoming).  And 
unlike most states, UK governments are – in normal times – constitutionally and politically 
empowered (by a tradition of strong executives facing relatively few legislative or judicial constraints) 
to act decisively if they so choose.  However, the fact that from May 2010 onwards the country was 
run by a coalition rather than a single-party majority government, meant that these were not normal 
times: instead of governing alone, as it had got used to doing in the post-war period, a centre-right 
party with a restrictionist agenda was obliged to share the spoils with a party widely seen as being as 
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being on the centre-left, not least because its platform on immigration and asylum was decidedly 
liberal. 
Our approach to that case study – and to the puzzle at its heart – is essentially institutionalist, and 
our method is process tracing – an approach based on documentary sources and (necessarily off-
the-record) interviews with senior government advisors and officials, which is well-suited to an 
attempt to comprehend complex causation (George and Bennett, 2005; see also Beach and 
Pedersen, 2012). Using this approach, we turn first to an examination of the way in which the two 
parties’ immigration policies made it into the programme of the coalition which the Conservative 
Party formed with the Liberal Democrats in May 2010.   
From election commitments to coalition agreement 
In the context of coalition governments, the first stage of understanding how and indeed whether an 
individual party’s position is fed into the governmental policymaking process is the negotiations that 
precede the formation of a coalition. If we are to trace partisan influence we need to account for this 
initial stage of bargaining and compromise; and if we want to understand why some partisan 
commitments make it while others do not, we need to scrutinise the process of coalition formation. 
Thus we begin by describing the Conservatives’ and Liberal Democrats’ very different commitments 
on immigration during the 2010 election campaign, consider what did and what did not make it into 
the coalition agreement, and then ask why. As will be seen, the substantial differences between the 
two parties on this issue were resolved overwhelmingly in favour of the majority partner.  
The Conservative’s headline commitment on immigration, first made by David Cameron in a 
television interview and then included in the Party’s 2010 election manifesto, was to cut the level of 
net migration (immigration minus emigration) to ‘tens of thousands a year, not hundreds of 
thousands’ by the end of the Parliament in 2015 (Conservative Party, 2010: 21). Given that net 
migration at that time was 252,000, a national record, this meant more than halving net inflows in 
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the space of just five years. It was nothing if not a bold promise. Over the previous decade, the 
Labour government had overseen a substantial increase in net migration, at least partly caused by 
their liberalisation of work-related and student migration routes and, crucially, the decision to allow 
A8 citizens access to the UK labour market in 2004. Immigration had become increasingly salient and 
public opinion had hardened. According to one 2010 survey, 65 per cent of British citizens viewed 
immigration as more of a problem than an opportunity and 63 per cent said that a party’s position 
on immigration would affect how they voted (Transatlantic Trends, 2010). 
The 2010 campaign was certainly not the first time that the Conservatives had promised a more 
restrictive immigration regime. Famously, and counter-productively insofar as it was subsequently 
said to have contributed to their ‘nasty party’ image, the Conservatives ran with the slogan ‘it’s not 
racist to impose limits on immigration’ in the 2005 election campaign (Conservative Party 2005: 18). 
The manifesto commitments of that year included a pledge to withdraw from the 1951 Geneva 
Convention on Refugees and to set a fixed quota for asylum seekers, as well as a commitment to set 
an overall annual limit to the number of immigrants. 
The 2010 manifesto dropped the proposals on refugees and asylum-seekers (who were by now less 
of a political issue) and changed the tone in line with Cameron’s attempt to ‘decontaminate’ his 
party’s brand: for example, the section dealing with immigration was entitled ‘attracting the 
brightest and best to our country’, a mantra that could have come straight from the New Labour 
hymnbook.  Despite this, nearly all of the policy proposals were about restricting rather than 
encouraging immigration. Similarly to 2005, the 2010 manifesto promised that a Conservative 
government would set an annual limit on the number of non-EU economic migrants, as well as apply 
transitional controls in the future on all new EU member states. On family migration, the party 
committed itself to introducing an English language test for all migrants coming to get married, and 
while a substantial section on student migration promised to make it easier for ‘reputable 
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universities and colleges’ to accept overseas students, it outlined a number of measures to tackle 
abuse of the student route (Conservative Party 2010: 21).1  
In stark contrast, the Liberal Democrats’ position on immigration was, on the face of it, one of the 
most permissive seen in any mainstream party manifesto in recent times. The Lib Dems had, like 
their opponents, accepted Labour’s  points based system and ‘managed migration’ more generally. 
However, far from promising to roll back the liberalisation of economic migration that had occurred 
under Labour, the Liberal Democrat manifesto proposed to extend it into two areas where Labour 
had been keen to be seen as tough – asylum and irregular migration. The proposals included a 
regularisation programme for irregular immigrants who had been living in the UK for over ten years 
and a number of progressive asylum measures, including taking asylum decision-making away from 
the Home Office, support for a more coordinated EU asylum system, allowing asylum-seekers to 
work, ending the detention of children in immigration detention centres, and reduced use of 
deportation and detention (Liberal Democrats 2010: 75-77). These commitments were hedged by a 
couple of more control-oriented policies – notably, the proposed reintroduction of exit checks and 
police powers for a National Border Force – and by a proposal to introduce a regional points-based 
system. However, the concrete proposals, as well as the absence of any restrictions on economic 
migration or international students, could hardly have been more different to the Conservatives’ 
position. Whatever else the Liberal Democrats’ position was, it was certainly not in tune with the 
decidedly restrictionist and populist tone of most print media coverage of immigration. In the 
televised leader’s debates, the Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg, had distanced himself from the 
Conservatives’ headline policy, saying ‘we can’t come up with promises like caps [on immigration], 
which don’t work’ (TV debate 29 April 2010), while his party’s promise of an ‘amnesty’ for irregular 
migrants was the main focus for the ferocious attack that the Tories and their allies in the media 
mounted after Clegg’s stand-out performance in the first debate sparked a phenomenal (albeit 
temporary) rise in the Lib Dem’s poll ratings.     
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It was clear, then, that the two parties had very different positions on immigration. But which of 
their respective election commitments made it into the coalition programme? And why? 
Undoubtedly the most significant commitment in terms of subsequent policy developments was the 
inclusion of the Conservative pledge to introduce an annual limit on non-EU economic migrants, with 
a claim that the mechanisms to achieve this would be ‘jointly’ considered. The numerical target to 
reduce net migration to ‘tens of thousands’ was not included in the programme: the Lib Dems 
regarded it as unworkable and even some Conservatives worried it was a hostage to fortune. That 
pledge, though, was nevertheless subsequently repeated by Conservative ministers so often that in 
spite of protestations from the Liberal Democrat Business Secretary, Vince Cable, that it was not a 
coalition policy, it effectively became one. The Conservative pledge to introduce transitional controls 
on future EU member states as a matter of course was also included. In contrast, with the exception 
of a commitment to end child detention, the only Liberal Democrat manifesto commitments that 
made it into the coalition programme were the border control measures. The progressive 
commitments on asylum and the proposed regularisation programme were dropped completely, as 
was the regional points based system. In two other areas where the Conservatives had promised 
restrictive policies but the Liberal Democrats had said nothing – international students and family 
migration – the coalition agreement was rather vague: it contained a pledge to ‘minimise abuse’ of 
the immigration system including student routes, and a promise to ‘explore new ways to improve 
the current asylum system’ (HM Government, 2010). 
Though many right-wing Tories claim to see the liberalising influence of Nick Clegg and his colleagues 
on everything the Coalition says and does, in the field of immigration it is clear that the 
Conservatives set the agenda. This was further reinforced by the allocation of ministerial portfolios. 
The positions of Home Secretary and Immigration Minister (a junior ministerial post within the 
Home Office) both went to Conservatives – Theresa May and Damian Green respectively. The only 
senior Liberal Democrat with a ministerial portfolio that really touched on immigration was Vince 
Cable, the Business Secretary, although his ministry, the Department for Business, Innovation and 
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Skills (commonly known by its acronym, BIS), also provided a home for David Willetts, a junior 
minister responsible for Universities and Science and a Conservative MP. Disagreements between 
the Home Office and BIS would become a significant fault line in coalition debates over immigration. 
But the situation in May 2010 was clear: in all but name, the coalition’s immigration policy was a 
Conservative immigration policy.2 
This was in no small way down to the fact that, right from the start of the negotiations, the 
Conservatives, who brought by far the majority of seats to the coalition, insisted that immigration 
was one of the ‘red-lines’ that they would not cross in order to do a deal (see Hazel and Yong, 2012, 
Wilson, 2010: 249, Laws 2010: 184). These non-negotiables proved crucial because the Liberal 
Democrat negotiating team – a team which, incidentally, excluded Vince Cable – seemed to have 
made up its mind early on that it could not afford to fight a second election and that (either for 
ideological or for arithmetical reasons, or perhaps both) it was going to have to govern with the 
Tories rather than with Labour (Adonis, 2013; Wilson, 2010; Laws, 2010). The Lib Dem negotiators 
(some of whom were never fans of their manifesto proposals on immigration anyway) were under 
no illusion either, given the brutal treatment handed out to those proposals during the election by 
the media and the negative reaction to them in polls and focus groups, that public opinion was on 
their side. Hardly surprising, then, that they were willing to let them slip away, preferring to focus 
their efforts on securing ‘wins’ which might eventually secure them some credit with ‘their’ voters – 
in particular their plan to end child detention.  As for the promise to make big reductions in numbers 
coming in, if it was achieved, then it would do the Coalition no harm; if not, it would probably be the 
Conservatives who got the blame.  Lib Dems also took comfort in the fact that there would be no 
actual cap on international students – one of the biggest and economically most important 
components of immigration – even if they were included in any overall target.  It is also important to 
remember, when trying to explain the deal that was done, that, as in many other areas, the Lib 
Dems were not especially well-prepared for negotiations, that they were up against the clock given 
both parties’ desire to conclude an agreement quickly, and that – understandably – they chose to 
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devote what limited time they had to securing their main priorities, of which immigration was not 
one. 
Immigration policy under the coalition  
Before examining the transposition of the coalition’s programme into policy, and the factors that 
have influenced this process, we briefly sketch what the government has done to date.  In other 
words, what changes there have been to our dependent variable – immigration policy outputs. It is 
quite clear that the motor propelling the coalition’s immigration policy is the net migration target. If 
the promise to more than halve net inflows over five years was to be redeemed, significant 
restrictive changes to the immigration system inherited from Labour were inevitable. Emigration is 
not something the government can do much about. The same goes for the entry of EU citizens, 
although, in an attempt make the UK a less attractive destination for migrants from Romania and 
Bulgaria (the transitional controls on which lapsed in January 2014), an inter-ministerial group was 
set up to explore welfare restrictions for EU migrants, which culminated in an announcement by 
David Cameron in November 2013 that the government would exclude new arrivals from publicly-
financed housing benefit and jobseeker’s allowance (unemployment benefit) for three months. This 
aside, the coalition has mainly focused its attention on reducing non-EU immigration in three areas 
where it does have the capacity to influence admissions: work-related migration, family migration, 
and foreign students.  
The main restrictions on labour migration include the closure of the Tier 1 general route, which had 
allowed highly skilled non-EU migrants to enter the UK without a job offer; the introduction of an 
annual cap on the number of Tier 2 non-EU skilled labour migrants with a job offer (set at 20,700 for 
the year from 6 April 2013 to 5 April 2014); and a raising of the shortage occupation list (which 
allows employers to bring in foreign workers without a labour market test, but only for specific 
occupations where there are not enough resident workers) to graduate-level jobs only. The main 
changes to family migration routes have seen a substantial increase in the financial requirements for 
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those wishing to bring family members to the UK and the introduction of a English language 
requirement for foreign spouses and civil partners. Student migration policy has also been 
significantly tightened. While several of the developments in student migration have been about 
tackling abuse of student routes, it is clear that there is also a distinct (if sometimes complementary) 
imperative to reduce numbers, which is unsurprising given that students are the largest migrant 
category. To this end, the coalition has abolished the Tier 1 post-study work route, under which 
foreign students could stay and look for work after finishing their studies, and introduced new rules 
that require foreign students who wish to stay in the UK after graduation to acquire a skilled job 
offer from an employer. The government has also increased the financial and language requirements 
for overseas students, and increased the restrictions on certain students’ rights to work or bring 
dependent relatives. In addition to these policy changes there has been an increase in scrutiny of 
institutions sponsoring foreign students. Most of this focused on private colleges and language 
schools, where most abuse of the system was deemed to be taking place, but in August 2012 the 
UKBA took the dramatic and controversial step of suspending London Metropolitan University’s 
licence to sponsor visa applications (since reinstated). Finally, the 2013 Immigration Bill, which at the 
time of writing is still being debated in Parliament, includes a number of provisions to make it easier 
to remove irregular immigrants, for example by limiting rights of appeal against removal decisions, 
and measures to restrict access to public services and the labour market (though of course irregular 
migrants do not count in the net migration target).   
From the coalition agreement to policy outputs  
Having won the first round of the coalition tussle over immigration policy, it remained to be seen 
whether the Conservatives would be able to deliver their election commitments in government. The 
transition from electoral politics to governing is no small step. Whereas voters are the principal, 
even sole, audience for parties’ political communications during election campaigns, in government 
parties must engage with a range of affected interests, which are often highly organised and well-
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resourced. Indeed, one influential model of immigration politics argues that it is the discrepancy 
between the restrictive preferences of the ‘unorganised public’ and the pro-immigration preferences 
of the ‘organised public’  (principally business interests) that accounts for why restrictive political 
discourse does not translate into equally restrictive policy outputs (Freeman, 1995). Under the 
previous Labour government, pro-immigration ‘clients’ such as the Confederation for British Industry 
(CBI), the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) and several sector-specific industry associations, such 
as the British Hospitality Association and the National Farmers’ Union, had become increasingly 
active on the immigration issue. Although these groups did not drive Labour’s liberalisation of 
economic migration routes, they certainly influenced policy through both formal consultations and 
informal lobbying (Consterdine and Hampshire, 2013; Somerville, 2007: 108; Balch, 2009). These 
groups might have been expected to mobilise against the new government’s commitment to restrict 
immigration. 
Furthermore, it remained to be seen how the broad-brush commitments of the coalition agreement 
would be translated into detailed policies inside the governmental machinery. Though the Liberal 
Democrats had signed up to a Tory agenda on immigration in late May 2010, there was still potential 
for subsequent negotiations over policy specifics to reignite disagreements between the coalition 
partners. And, as immigration is an issue that cuts across departmental boundaries and often reveals 
disagreements between departments (for example, between control-oriented interior ministries and 
pro-immigration business or finance ministries), intra-executive disputes were also a possibility. 
These different dimensions of potential intra-coalition conflict – partisan differences and functional 
logics – may be self-reinforcing or have a tendency to cancel one another out, depending on 
whether the allocation of ministerial portfolios maps party ideology onto bureaucratic function. 
In short, the transposition of election pledges into policy outputs is influenced by a number of 
intervening variables, a complex interplay of non-governmental influences and intra-coalition 
dynamics. To unpack these interrelationships and their causal impact on policy outputs, we examine 
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to what extent non-governmental actors influenced immigration policymaking (for example, by 
tempering the coalition’s restrictive agenda), how intra-coalition dynamics (in terms of partisan and 
interdepartmental divisions) shaped outputs, and the how these different factors interacted with 
one another. 
The role of interest groups 
There is clear evidence that lobbying by employers tempered the government’s original proposals on 
economic migration. The proposals on work-related routes were put out for consultation in late June 
2010, including inter alia: proposals to raise the minimum criteria for qualification under Tier 1; a 
monthly quota for skilled workers under Tier 2; a merger of the Shortage Occupation and Resident 
Labour Market Test routes; increased English language requirements for Tier 2 applicants; and the 
inclusion of intra-company transferees within the annual cap. The level of the annual cap was also 
put out for separate consultation. The proposals met with strong and often public opposition from a 
number of employers’ associations, including the CBI and FSB, sectoral organisations, and numerous 
large corporations, among them Asda (owned by Walmart), BT, Deutsche Bank, General Electric, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Honda, JP Morgan, Microsoft UK, Nissan, Siemens, and Toyota. Furthermore, 
several overseas governments, notably the Indian government during a high profile trade mission 
led by David Cameron, expressed their concern about what Anand Sharma, India’s Commerce 
Minister, described as the potential ‘adverse effect’ on trade relations  (see Bale and Hampshire 
2012). 
The government responded with a public relations offensive – Damian Green, then Immigration 
Minister, was dispatched to India to allay concerns and gave a speech insisting that the UK would 
remain ‘open for business’ (Green 2010). More importantly, several of the proposed restrictions 
were amended or dropped altogether. Although the Tier 1 General Route for highly-skilled workers 
was closed and an annual quota was established for Tier 2, the latter was set at a relatively high level 
(which has not been exceeded to date and has not therefore curtailed the number of skilled migrant 
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workers) and the former was not something employers were especially concerned about as it did 
not affect their ability to recruit overseas workers. Further, following lobbying by several banks and 
law firms in the City, foreign workers earning over £150,000 were exempted altogether from the 
annual cap – meaning companies can still recruit as many workers as they wish at this level – and 
even more significantly in terms of migrant numbers, multinationals were successful in their efforts 
to have intra-corporate transferees excluded from the cap. Thus work-related migration policy has 
been tightened, as the Conservatives promised, but significantly less than they originally intended 
after intensive lobbying by business. There is nothing especially unusual or surprising about this: 
such lobbying is particularly likely to succeed if those doing it can credibly tell government that what 
it intends to do will have a negative impact in an important area that it knows more about than 
ministers (see Bernhagen, 2013).  However, it does illustrate the role of interest groups as 
intervening variables in the translation of election pledges into policy outputs – something that is 
surely important if we want to understand how and why (rather than just whether) parties matter 
for policy. 
Indeed, if we compare the significant concessions made to the work-related proposals with the more 
direct translation of the government’s pledges on family migration we can see the differential effect 
of interest groups between subfields of immigration policy. In the case of family migration policy, 
where there are fewer and certainly less influential interest groups, the government’s original 
proposals have been largely implemented. The commitment to introduce English language 
requirements for foreign spouses and civil partners, though strongly opposed by migrants’ rights 
groups and other NGOs, was swiftly implemented with no formal consultation (the policy was 
announced on 9 June 2010 and came into force on 29 November 2010). Similarly, the increased 
financial requirements for those wishing to bring family members to the UK were firmly opposed by 
NGOs, but implemented with no significant concessions. 
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The amount of concessions won by affected interests in the area of student migration sits 
somewhere between economic and family migration policy. There has been significant and 
increasingly vocal opposition from the higher and further education sectors to government policy on 
international students (see, recently, Universities UK, 2013). And MPs and Lords, including 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, have also criticised the government for, they argue, damaging 
one of the UK’s largest export industries. No fewer than five parliamentary committees have urged 
the government to remove international students from the net migration figures to prevent 
downward pressure from negatively affecting student recruitment. In response, the government has 
made a few minor concessions, but far fewer than on work migration. In particular, it has refused to 
remove students from the net migration figures and it has pressed ahead with several of its more 
restrictive policies. 
There are a number of reasons why the education lobby and its parliamentary supporters have been 
unable to wring as many concessions as business achieved on labour migration. First, according to 
senior officials that we interviewed, Universities UK and the education sector as a whole is less used 
to lobbying and is not yet as effective as business at doing so, often achieving a degree of publicity 
but relatively little leverage.  For instance, the sector has not managed (and may not even have tried) 
to persuade the Home Office to task the government’s Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) to look 
into the issue and make recommendations. Second, notwithstanding criticisms from parliamentary 
committees, there has been relatively little pressure and no organised campaign from MPs sitting in 
what are sometimes thought of as ‘university seats’ – partly because they come from different 
parties and partly because it is not always easy, given that a town or city’s university institutions and 
student population may be spread across several parliamentary constituencies, to identify a 
particular MP as the representative of the university or universities concerned. There is also little 
evidence of HE lobbyists targeting their efforts at either Conservative MPs, or at those Tories in the 
Number Ten Policy Unit charged with writing the Party’s next manifesto. Third, there was significant 
resolve in government to put downward pressure on students because if total immigration was to be 
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reduced, it would be crucial to cut student numbers since they represented the largest single inflow. 
Moreover, many in government believed that there really was significant abuse of the system, 
particularly in the further education and language school sectors. Recent statistics indicate that the 
government has successfully tightened student migration policy, especially in the latter sectors: in 
the year to March 2013, 206,814 study visas were issued, which was a fall of 9 per cent overall 
compared with the previous 12 months, but the falls in the further education and language school 
sectors was 46 per cent, against a 5 per cent increase in the university sector (ONS 2013). The latter 
increase – and the fact that there is no actual cap on international students, even if the numbers 
coming in are included in the government’s net target – probably undermined HE lobbyists’ efforts 
to ease what they continue to argue is still a restrictive regime. 
In summary, the lesser influence of the education compared to the business lobby on the coalition’s 
immigration policy shows that not all pro-immigration clients are equal; their influence is not a 
straightforward consequence of the distribution of costs and benefits of a given policy, as Freeman 
(1995) has argued, but is also influenced by the opportunity structures that client groups face and 
the lobbying strategies that they adopt in light of these structures.  At the same time, since the 
degree and scope of organized interests’ influence varies not only between countries but also 
between policy subfields within a given country, any attempt to read off partisan influence by simply 
comparing pledges and outputs risks obscuring an important intervening variable with differential in-
country as well as cross-national effects. 
Intra-coalition dynamics 
Assessing partisan influence on policy in the context of coalition government is further complicated 
by intra-coalition dynamics. While tensions in the UK Coalition are often depicted in the media as 
evidence of partisan or ideological conflict between the coalition partners (perhaps especially so in 
the UK, where coalition is a relative novelty), our interviews revealed that it is not always easy to 
unpick party conflict from inter-departmental turf wars. When, for example, a Conservative minister 
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from the Home Office encounters opposition from a Liberal Democrat at the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, it is often difficult (and requires in-depth case knowledge) to assess 
whether partisan influence or conflicting departmental agendas, or both, are at stake. Ministers will 
have their own ideological leanings, of course, but given their reliance on officials in the process of 
translating broad electoral promises into detailed policy outputs (Page 2012), it is likely that 
departmental policy agendas play a significant role in these disputes. This observation is further 
supported by the sometime disagreement between ministers from the same party based in different 
departments.  
In the present case, there has certainly been debate and disagreement within the coalition about 
immigration policy, both behind the scenes and in public. Vince Cable in particular has persistently 
stated that the net migration target is not, in fact, coalition policy and he has openly criticised senior 
Conservative’s statements on immigration. For example, he described a major speech about 
immigration given by the Prime Minister shortly before the April 2011 local elections as ‘very unwise’ 
and in March 2013 said that if net migration was reduced to below 100,000 ‘enormous damage 
would be done’ (Waugh and Macrory 2013). The core problem according to Cable, as he told a group 
of Indian journalists at Heathrow Airport, is that the government is ‘trying to reconcile two different 
objectives, one of which is to reassure the British public that immigration is under control, and the 
other is to have an open economy where we can bring the talents from around the world’ (quoted in 
Barker 2010).  In the wake of a big drop in the numbers of students coming to the UK from India, 
Cable has also criticised media coverage (and by implication Conservatives who have helped stoke it) 
of the news that overseas student numbers were coming down: students he claimed had been 
caught up in a ‘very torrid and emotional debate in the UK. When… the number declines, this is 
[seen as] a great triumph for immigration control – which is quite absurd and unfortunately is 




Cable and other Liberal Democrat ministers have made several attempts to constrain Conservative 
policies – and with some effect. On labour migration, Cable played an important role expressing the 
opposition of business to the cuts to work-related routes and persuaded the Conservative Home 
Secretary, Theresa May, to accept the exclusion of intra-corporate transferees and workers earning 
over £150,000 from the skilled workers cap. And in the rather different context of the ministerial 
group examining cuts to benefits and social services for migrants, David Laws, the Liberal Democrat 
Schools Minister, seems to have successfully resisted Home Office proposals to exclude the children 
of illegal immigrants from schools (Watts, 2013). 
Yet despite these examples of Liberal Democrats constraining Conservative proposals, two things 
seem clear. First, on balance the Liberal Democrats have not been able significantly to constrain the 
Conservatives’ determination to reduce net migration through more restrictive immigration policies; 
and second, insofar as intra-coalition disagreements have constrained restrictions they have been 
driven as much by inter-departmental logics as ideological or partisan conflict. To be sure, what is 
sometimes presented in the media as Cable’s running battle with Theresa May has a partisan 
dimension, and given their apparent leadership ambitions it may also be about personal positioning 
within their own parties. But it is equally, if not more, a conflict between two government 
departments with very different views of immigration: a control-oriented and media-sensitive Home 
Office versus a liberal-inclined and economistic Department for Business. It is notable that Cable’s 
statements on what he calls the ‘inherent tension’ (Waugh and Macrory 2013) between the Home 
Office’s obsession with reassuring the public that immigration is under control on the one hand, and 
the need to allow UK higher education and business to recruit the people they need on the other,  
frame the conflict in functional rather than partisan terms. 
This is not to say that the personal views, ideological leanings, or party ambitions of the key actors 
are irrelevant; rather that, as ministers, they often read from a script written by government 
mandarins and affected interests rather than party strategists. It is also worth noting that tensions 
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within the Conservative Party, tensions that are found in many centre-right parties on immigration 
policy (Bale 2008) reflect these functional dilemmas, too.  Most obviously, David Willets, the 
Universities Minister, has not gone along quietly with Home Office plans to reduce student numbers, 
and it is noticeable that the reductions have come mainly at the expense of further education and 
language schools, rather than tertiary institutions, even if the latter may suffer in the long-term as 
‘feeder’ colleges produce fewer students. Indeed, Cable’s and Willets’ shared concern about the 
economic impact of immigration restrictions has been the basis of an occasional inter-party alliance 
against May and Green (and his successor as Immigration Minister, Mark Harper) at the Home Office.  
For other Conservative Ministers, resistance to the demands of the Home Office may have more to 
do with (what they see) as administrative common sense combined with an inherent distaste for 
‘red-tape’ that reduces economic freedom and therefore growth: the resistance from Communities 
Secretary, Eric Pickles, usually portrayed as a no-nonsense right winger, on the proposed 
requirement that all private landlords check the immigration status of their tenants is a case in point 
(see Hope, 2013). As several of the senior advisors we spoke to pointed out, opposition to Home 
Office proposals from a range of ministers – both Conservative and Liberal Democrat – has led the 
Prime Minister to complain on more than one occasion that some members of the Cabinet seem 
intent on undermining the government’s net migration pledge. 
Yet the Home Office remains the ‘big beast’ in the UK government jungle when it comes to 
immigration – certainly much bigger than BIS.  Even if the latter makes the argument for a less 
restrictive stance on international students, the former is likely to get its way, not least since the 
Home Secretary can claim that she is delivering on one of her party’s flagship manifesto 
commitments – one that enjoys support from voters and, as such, is a priority for the Prime Minister, 
who as several of our interviewees told us, has often supported her in inter-departmental disputes.  
This presumes, of course, that such disputes always involve consultation of other departments.  On 
some occasions they do: in the case of student migration, there are formal (though not routine) 
meetings at Minister of State Level.  On the other hand, there have been occasions where the lack of 
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consultation – or even just prior notice – has been marked, even shocking. BIS, for example, was 
given no warning when the Home Office decided to suspend London Metropolitan University’s 
licence to admit international students on the grounds that it was not doing all it should to monitor 
students – a decision that, even though the suspension turned out to be fairly short-lived, garnered 
widespread and hugely negative publicity in the Indian sub-continent, and may have contributed to 
the UK’s declining share of that market.  
However, the deeply-entrenched departmental pecking order at the heart of Whitehall is only part 
of the explanation for the apparent inability of the Liberal Democrats to exert much influence on 
coalition immigration policy. And even their inexperience, their supposed ineptitude at playing the 
governmental game, and their relative lack of resources (Hazell and Yong, 2012, passim) can only 
take us so far. What also matters is their sense, as a political party trying to learn from the past and 
thinking about the future, of what may benefit or damage them electorally. In this respect, some 
Liberal Democrats have been secretly relieved to find themselves only occasionally playing the role 
of the coalition’s ’progressive’, if largely ineffectual, conscience. As one Liberal Democrat advisor 
told us, the party’s immigration commitments did not go down well during the 2010 campaign, and 
there was considerable relief among some in the leadership that they were able to drop them with 
comparatively little fuss as part of the coalition agreement. Given the state of public opinion on the 
issue, there is so little electoral advantage in adopting permissive immigration measures that a 
degree – but no more than a degree – of resistance to Conservative-led restrictions arguably allows 
the party to pacify its liberal activists while remaining sufficiently under the radar as far as most 
voters are concerned to avoid the kind of backlash that arguing loudly for, let alone actually 
implementing, truly liberal policies might create. 
Even this may be underplaying things, since there are signs that the Liberal Democrats are 
repositioning themselves on immigration. Increased public support for UKIP, which is now as much 
an anti-immigration as an anti-EU party, has prompted all mainstream parties to reassert their 
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credentials on immigration. The Liberal Democrats hung on to their seat at the high-profile Eastleigh 
by-election in February 2013, but UKIP came in second on a 19.3% swing.  And at the local elections 
in spring 2013, UKIP gained 139 councillors in England and Wales, with the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats losing 335 and 124 respectively. It is no coincidence that sandwiched between the 
Eastleigh result and the local elections, Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minister, broke his silence on 
immigration with a speech that was a far cry from the pledges of regularisation programmes and 
liberal asylum measures in the 2010 manifesto. Instead, the centrepiece of his speech was a 
proposal that the government would require £1,000 deposits for visa applicants from ‘high-risk’ 
countries, with the money being repaid only when they leave the UK. Clegg’s speech went down 
very badly with party activists: according to one insider, it was roundly criticised at the Party’s 
federal policy committee. The visa bond proposal was certainly a hastily developed idea, apparently 
dreamed up by an adviser with some personal experience of the existing visa system.  However, the 
Party itself was not the intended audience. The leadership was more concerned about internal 
qualitative and quantitative research which confirmed impressions gained on the doorstep that large 
numbers of voters who had or would consider voting Lib Dem saw immigration as a big issue, 
rationalising their concerns as worries about pressures on schools, housing and health services.  And 
Clegg’s subsequent support for the government’s proposed benefit restrictions for EU migrants 
signalled an even bigger shift from the progressive tone of the 2010 manifesto. 
Conclusion: parties matter … to a point 
In this paper we have examined partisan influence on immigration policy by tracing the process 
through which electoral pledges were (or were not) translated into UK coalition government policy. 
We conclude with some observations on the implications of our case for understanding partisan 
influence on public policy in general and immigration policy in particular.   
First, it is striking that despite the formation of a coalition between two parties with opposed policy 
positions, as well as interest group lobbying and intra-coalition conflicts in government, partisan 
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influence on immigration policy is evident. In the early 2000s, the Labour government liberalised 
immigration policy (see Consterdine and Hampshire 2013, Somerville 2007, Spencer 2011) and the 
coalition has clearly introduced a more restrictive agenda. Despite its reliance on coalition partners 
with a more liberal policy and despite significant opposition from pro-immigration interest groups, 
the Conservative Party has been able to transpose its core election pledges into policy outputs. In 
short, we find evidence of partisan influence on policies and, insofar as those policies are at least 
partially responsible for the reduction in immigration flows, on outcomes as well. 
Our analysis therefore throws doubt on the migration literature that downplays the significance of 
political parties for immigration policy outputs as well as outcomes, whether due to the lock-in 
effects of previous policy decisions (Hansen 2002) the influence of pro-immigration clients (Freeman 
1995), or the supposed inability of governments to influence migration flows. The fact that UK 
immigration policy has gone from being one of the most restrictive anywhere in Europe during the 
1980s, to one of the most liberal under Labour in the early 2000s, and has now moved back in a 
more restrictive direction under a Conservative-led coalition since 2010 undermines the idea that 
there is a structural ‘expansionary bias’ in immigration policymaking (Freeman 1995). In the UK’s 
majoritarian democracy, immigration policies move sometimes in an expansionary direction, 
sometimes in a restrictive direction; and which party or parties are in government matters for 
explaining this. Further, although other non-policy factors no doubt play a role, the fact that 
numbers have come down in those areas where policy has been most significantly tightened, namely 
family and non-tertiary student migration, shows that governments are far from powerless in 
influencing migration outcomes. 
However, our case also illustrates how partisan influence on immigration policy outputs is mediated 
and constrained. Partisan influence has been mediated as much by  functional dilemmas manifested 
through inter-departmental disagreements as by  political differences between the coalition 
partners (though the former are sometimes reinforced or presented as partisan differences 
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depending on ministerial portfolios). The variation between policy subfields (e.g. work, student, and 
family migration) shows it has also been heavily mediated by organized interests. To understand the 
degree to which electoral pledges influence policy outputs therefore requires examination of the 
interplay between partisan change, interest groups, and interdepartmental conflict. Our case 
suggests that while it is sometimes possible to parse these different elements, often it is not. In-
depth process tracing allows us to see these complex dynamics, which easily get lost in large n 
comparisons of pledges and outputs, let alone outcomes. At the same time, our case reveals 
limitations of scholarly approaches to immigration that focus on one or the other of the factors 
outlined above: political economists on employers and other lobby groups; party scholars on 
political parties; and institutionalists on functional and bureaucratic conflict. In the search for 
parsimonious explanations a lot of non-trivial complexity gets lost. Each of the above approaches has 
considerable merits, but can provide at best a partial picture of how politics shapes immigration 
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1 The specific proposals included a bond for foreign students at new or unregistered institutions, a 
requirement for foreign students to demonstrate financial means of support, and a requirement that students 
must usually leave the country and reapply if they wish to switch to another course or apply for a work permit. 
This latter commitment meant closing the post-study work route established by Labour, under which foreign 
graduates could stay and look for work for up to two years after finishing their studies. 
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2  This statement stands in apparent contrast with the claim by the authors of one of the most impressive 
works to date on the working of the Coalition (which admittedly makes very few mentions of immigration) that 
the origin of the policies in the relevant section of its Programme for Government was ‘one-third from the Tory 
manifesto, one-third from the Lib Dems, and one-third from both’ (Hazell and Yong, 2012).  The difference is 
largely methodological: they simply enumerate policies in the agreement based on their manifesto origins 
without giving a relative weight  to any of the proposals. We would contend that inclusion of an annual limit 
on economic migrants, for example, should be given more weight in any evaluation of partisan influence than 
some of the less significant commitments taken from the Lib Dem manifesto. 
